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When foreigners come to Germany to speak about 
European foreign policy and defence, their ‘Stichwort’ 
is almost always: capabilities, capabilities, capabilities. 
It should no longer be any secret that one of France’s 
and Britain’s strongest motives in launching (at St. 
Malo) the process that led to the EU’s new Security and 
Defence Policy was the hope of kickstarting the better 
adaptation and use of European military resources for 
new post-Cold War tasks, in Germany above all. They 
have arguably had quite a bit of success, or at least 
more than NATO could have had in its own; despite the 
fact that the Alliance has been taking major decisions, 
and asserting pressures, for military transformation 
from as far back as 1994. It is just as obvious that things 
need to go much further, but I don’t particularly want to 
use time in this talk to pursue that point in detail – for 
two reasons. The less important one is that I am not a 
military-technical specialist. The more important reason 
is that no-one, least of all myself as the Director of a 
peace research institute, should see defence and security 
capabilities as an end in themselves or as necessarily a 
good thing in themselves. The question is what they are 
needed for; and I have a suspicion that one of the 
reasons why Germany and other Euro- 
pean countries have not yet been ready for a more 
genuine revolution in their approach to defence and 
security is that no-one has yet fully and convincingly 
answered the question ‘Warum’ – ‘wofür’ – cui bono? 
The ESDP was launched in fact, essentially as a 
capabilities programme related to a set of purely generic 
military scenarios; without threat analysis, without 
strategic plan or military doctrine, without the 
formulation of a more general security philosophy. 
Even today, the EU’s draft constitution and the 
European Security Strategy adopted by the European 
Council last December have only filled the gap 
partially, and in very broad and still ambiguous terms, 
while the debate continues on how to formulate an EU 
military ‘strategic doctrine’ or whether we want one at 
all. 
 
What I would like to do, therefore, today is to address 
one macro-question about the purpose or ‘finalité’ of 
the EU’s external security and defence policies, and 
four middle-level questions that flow from it. I will 
draw attention on the process to some practical or 
‘micro’-questions that may be particularly critical or, at 
least, particularly timely at this stage. My focus will be 
mainly on the security (in the broadest sense) and de-
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fence dimensions of the EU’s work because that is what 
I know best, but at least some of the larger questions 
will, I hope, have resonance for the non-security 
dimensions of European common foreign policy and 
indeed for other EU external policies as well.  
 
My big question may at first surprise you: is the 
European security and defence policy really designed to 
serve the needs, interests and values of the EU and of 
Europe generally, or of someone or something else? My 
answer is that at first, it undoubtedly had goals and 
motives lying outside the sphere of European 
integration proper. Just as one statesman spoke in the 
past of ‘calling the New World into existence to redress 
the balance of the Old’, I believe that not just the UK 
which pushed the ESDP initiative, but many other 
Europeans who supported it, saw it as a new way of 
promoting reform and renewal in NATO. Not only 
would any new capacities created be available for 
NATO as well as EU missions, but NATO’s role in 
supporting the EU Headline Goal forced an updating of 
the Alliance’s own defence planning system; the EU’s 
requirement for planning and command-and-control 
support for its own missions consolidated NATO’s shift 
of military focus away from territorial defence to the 
‘new tasks’, and so on. In the event, the fact that two 
out of three of the EU’s first military missions (and by 
far the largest ones) involved taking over operations 
from NATO has ensured that this inter-institutional 
dynamic remains dominant even at the day-to-day level 
of ESDP work.  
 
At higher political level, the UK believed in 1999 and 
perhaps still believes that any short-term US concerns 
over the motives and impact of ESDP would be less 
important than the US’s longer-term realization that 
Europe was getting ready at last to bear a fair share of 
its own security burdens, something which should 
surely strengthen rather than endanger the overall trans-
Atlantic partnership. Of course, you may point out that 
many people in France had exactly the opposite motive, 
to build up ESDP as an alternative to the Atlantic 
defence framework; either with the idea of hastening 
the end of the latter which was more of a hindrance than 
help for tackling the new security agenda, or at least, of 
getting some kind of reinsurance ready in case NATO 
should collapse of its own accord. But my point still 
stands, namely that these were motives that took their 
start in the US/European strategic space and used the 
EU framework, as it were, instrumentally. This helps to 
explain why the first key design features of ESDP, 
including the guidelines for its relations with NATO, 
were kept so close in practice to the corresponding 
features in the former Western European Union (WEU) 
and WEU/NATO relations, rather than looking for 
precedents within the EU itself. It also explains why, in 
preparing the ESDP’s constituent documents, there was 
such a fierce debate about the formula indicating that 
the EU would carry out military operations only 
“where NATO as a whole was not engaged”. On any 
objective view this was surely a non-issue, given that 
there were more than enough NATO members in the 
EU to block any attempted initiatives there that ignored 
NATO’s interests, and that there were more than 
enough cases for intervention to keep both institutions 
busy, and that their respective choice of missions would 
be dictated in practice by their very different strengths 
and weaknesses. If, however, EU/NATO relations as a 
part of the reinvention of transatlantic strategic 
partnership were (for many people) what the ESDP was 
all about, it was quite natural that this question of 
formal precedence between the Alliance and its new 
‘young brother’ should be the question of all questions 
to resolve clearly at the outset. 
 
The trouble with this whole policy approach is that the 
younger brother image actually makes no sense for the 
EU: the EU is more like a fat woman alongside 
NATO’s thin and muscular man. For the EU, ESDP is 
only a small addition to an already very wide, almost 
full-spectrum range of competences, policies and 
resources relevant to security promotion and crisis 
management, whereas for NATO military action is a 
central and (for good or ill) increasingly an almost 
exclusive focus. Thus while it may make sense to talk 
about EU action ‘complementing’ or ‘completing’ 
NATO’s capacities in terms of military intervention as 
strictly defined, in the big picture of post-cold war 
security the boot is very much on the other foot: it is the 
Union that has the wide range and NATO that provides 
a pretty specialized add-on. Moreover, while I have 
argued for the importance of the Atlantic-related 
motivation in the shaping of ESDP, it is clear that this 
was not the whole story and that there was also, if only 
at subterranean and subconscious level, a logic internal 
to the process of European construction that made the 
breakthroughs of St. Malo and of Helsinki possible at 
this particular time in history. You could relate it to the 
‘deepening’ of integration through the Treaties of 
Maastricht and Amsterdam, including perhaps 
especially the historic integration of internal security 
cooperation under Pillar Three into the Treaty structure; 
or you could relate it – as I am more tempted to do – to 
the widening of the EU’s security horizons and 
responsibilities through the enlargement process, the 
shift to a strategy of eventual full integration for solving 
the Balkans problem, and perhaps even the change in 
nature of the Europe/Russia relationship. 
 
In any event, the question I would like to bring to a 
point now is: are the years from 2005 onwards the time 
when the EU should and will start following its own 
logic more in the development of ESDP, and other 
people’s logic less? Leaving aside the question of desir-
ability, I could provisionally offer some hypotheses 
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about why this might be feasible or probable, for 
example:  
 
- because US behaviour under the second Presidency 
of George W. Bush continues to alienate (all) 
Europeans, and thus to make the different values of 
and basis for purely European security cooperation 
even clearer; 
- because the Europeans learn the lessons of Spring 
2003 and refuse to be split again as they were over 
the outbreak of the Iraq war, which could lead to a 
kind of further Flucht nach vorn as they attempt to 
guarantee their future unity through new formal 
common structures and doctrines; 
- because it becomes clear that NATO has become 
historically weakened or at least, narrowed and 
altered beyond repair, meaning that it is a waste of 
time to try to manipulate the ESDP as a tool to 
‘save’ NATO and that we do perhaps need to start 
looking at it as something more like an eventual 
successor or replacement for the Alliance; 
- because the actual nature of security crises over the 
next few years throws the focus back on fields that 
are more relevant to EU competences and/or unique 
EU strengths; and/or 
- because the internal dynamism of EU politics while 
we are waiting for ratification of the new 
constitution, and engaging in painful negotiations 
about the future budget, might push both old and 
new members towards fresh efforts in ESDP as one 
area where unity can be built relatively cheaply and 
particularly visibly. 
 
There are probably more factors that could be 
mentioned, and there are certainly some that would 
push in the opposite direction. For today’s purposes, 
however, I would like to go on to ask a second set of 
questions about what a European security and defence 
policy that expressed the EU’s own logic and Europe’s 
own identity and interests would look like. They will 
cover (i) what kind of security we want to provide for 
ourselves at home, (ii) what security functions the EU 
should have towards the wider world,  (iii) what mix 
and balance of tools we need for the purpose, and (iv) 
how far the ESDP, and CFSP generally, is or should be 
based on the wishes of European citizens themselves. 
 
 
‘Real’ European defence? 
 
When ESDP was launched in the neutral European 
capital of Helsinki at end-1999, it could not have been 
made clearer that this initiative was ‘only’ about 
military crisis management, and not about ‘real’ 
defence – i.e. the direct protection of European 
territories against military attack – which would remain 
the business of  
NATO. This formula reflected a sensitive compromise 
at the time between France, the UK, and the EU’s non-
NATO members: but the dividing line it tried to create 
by no means looks so clear in the light of other realities 
about the EU, both old and new. In the beginning, 
Monnet and Schumann invented the EC for a 
fundamental security purpose i.e. to make it impossible 
for countries within Western Europe ever to fight each 
other again. They succeeded splendidly; and the 
benefits of this no-war zone have recently been spread 
across the whole Eastern side of Europe, and should 
soon also cover the Balkan states who have experienced 
real war in Europe within as recently as a decade. Since 
the 1950’s, the EU has become in practice the first 
place we look for our security in our own homes and 
countries across a whole string of functional fields: 
energy supply, protection of the environment, aviation 
and maritime safety, nuclear safety, the handling of 
animal and human disease epidemics, the control of 
exports of dangerous goods, and more recently the 
coverage of all aspects of frontier security and the 
combating of crime, smuggling and terrorism through 
Justice and Home Affairs cooperation and the Schengen 
system. In this last area, the recent high profiling of 
terrorist threats to internal security and the real-life 
tragedy of Madrid in March last year have spurred 
European leaders to adopt a highly original ‘solidarity’ 
commitment to each other, promising to come to each 
others’ aid if any EU member is attacked by terrorists, 
and to do so with all necessary means – including 
military ones. With this (at least in principle), the range 
of security protection that the Union provides for its 
citizens has come almost full circle, leaving only the 
one specific and rather narrow case of a traditional 
military attack on our countries as still primarily 
someone else’s business. 
 
In fact, as you will know, the EU’s new draft 
Constitution does contain a clause committing EU 
members to show solidarity by reaching jointly to a 
military attack on their territory as well. But this is 
undermined by language stating that NATO has priority 
in this regard for its members, and that the distinct 
national defence policies of the EU’s six neutral or neo-
neutral member states are not affected. It is evident that, 
in practice, ESDP is not occupying itself with 
organizing EU members’ armed forces for territorial 
defence, and it has not faced up (perhaps for obvious 
reasons!) to questions such as whether this defence 
could be effective without the dedication of at least 
some nuclear forces to the EU. Should we see this as, in 
fact, a perfectly pragmatic compromise, designed inter 
alia to avoid chopping off the one main branch that 
NATO is now sitting on before it is ready to fall of its 
own accord? Or can this only be seen as an interim ‘fix’ 
from which a policy truly reflecting the Union’s own 
logic and interests will  
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have to move on, towards something that matches more 
closely the words in our Treaty and Constitution about 
an eventual ‘common defence’? 
 
There are two essentially temporary and contingent 
reasons for saying No, i.e. the concern already 
mentioned not to determine NATO or alienate the 
Americans needlessly, and the difficulties involved for 
the six EU states who have so far declined to exchange 
defence guarantees. There is a more general argument 
that points in the same direction, i.e. that the whole 
question of territorial military defence is now outdated, 
since the risks are infinitesimal of Europe ever being 
attacked in that particular way again by Russia or any 
other state – as distinct from terrorist or other non-state 
attacks that are already catered for. On this argument 
there is no merit in destroying a NATO commitment 
what already exists and has some residual merit in tying 
the Americans to us, but no sense in taking trouble to 
create a new commitment in the EU or any other 
setting. Without necessarily coming down on one side 
or other of the argument myself, let me just list some 
points that go the other way: 
 
- it is now EU doctrine that national armed forces 
may be used cooperatively within our own territory 
to meet terrorist attacks and their consequences, and 
also natural disasters and accidents that may 
threaten life and property in similar ways such as 
floods, power cut-outs or collapse of supply 
networks and communications. At present EU 
countries have widely varying rules for using 
military assets in this context and the planning of 
effective Europe-wide responses will have to 
surmount major obstacles of both a practical and 
political kind. To try to solve this problem, and also 
the existing one of streamlining EU armed forces 
for crisis management missions, without giving EU 
planners effective competence to address the role of 
all national forces – and to discuss openly the 
possible need for resource shifts or new kinds of 
double-hatting between internal and external, 
territorial and non-territorial defence functions – is 
starting to look increasingly impractical and 
unreasonable: while practical experience suggests 
that this kind of incoherence and institutional 
demarcation at European level only makes it easier 
for individual states to delay facing up to the real 
needs of defence reform. (The same argument about 
the EU needing to see and draw conclusions from 
the whole defence picture applies in a much more 
obvious way to the recently enhanced efforts to 
foster effective European defence industrial 
cooperation though the EU); 
 
- secondly, to the extent that traditional military 
defence may still be needed, we cannot necessarily 
count on NATO to plan and provide it any longer in 
practical terms, even if the legal and political 
significance of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty 
can be preserved. Since the Prague decisions of 
2002 NATO has been working more or less 
exclusively on planning and executing overseas 
missions: it no longer has any overall defence plan 
for Alliance territory and it has only the lightest of 
‘footprints’ on the territory of its new Central 
European members and the Eastern Länder. This 
increasingly non-territorial approach by the 
Alliance as a whole reflects the similar shift in the 
USA’s national defence policy, which now sees 
overseas military bases increasingly as jumping-off 
points for action into hostile territory, rather than as 
part of a defensive network involving permanent 
integration with the forces of host nations. These 
trends are more likely to be accelerated than 
reversed under the second George W. Bush 
Administration. They open up the prospect that, 
unless the EU can move towards being prepared 
more openly to guarantee its own territory, the 
Europeans will find themselves with an overall 
deficit in strategic protection all too soon, and in 
circumstances where their actual territorial 
responsibilities and vulnerabilities have greatly 
increased and are likely to increase further (if 
Turkey joins, up to the borders of Iran, Iraq and 
Syria!) through Enlargement. In such a case, 
showing that Europe is ready to shoulder the main 
burden of its own safety in the existential sense (not 
just local crisis management!) could become no 
longer a matter of impressing the Americans as it 
was supposed to be at St. Malo and Helsinki, but a 
straightforward demand of our own self-preser-
vation as a community and as a continent; 
 
- thirdly, common defence has not been – even in the 
NATO context – just a response to outside threats, 
but also an inwardly generated expression of the 
Europeans’ wish to give up nationalistic approaches 
to defence and security for ever. It means giving up 
the options, not just of attacking neighbours, but of 
failing to help them in their hour of need. NATO’s 
large permanent multinational formations, mainly 
created in German territory, used to both symbolize 
this anti-nationalist dimension of the new European 
defence culture and help to maintain it by the day-
to-day mixing of military cadres at all levels and 
their experience of common dangers and trials. 
Much of this system has now gone for good, and 
although European forces working together in the 
Balkans or on overseas deployments may have very 
intense experiences of the same kind, the ad hoc 
nature of these missions means by definition that 
not all allies can have the same experience, or have 
it consistently with the same partners. The EU 
already does create this kind of ‘socializing’ 
experience and community-building effect through 
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the way it brings national experts together in all 
other fields of its competence, and it hopefully does 
so for the rather limited number of officers who 
work in the EU Military Staff and the EU Military 
Committee in Brussels. Certain EU countries have 
been striving for many years to achieve the same 
kind of effects at operational level through the 
permanent structure of the Eurocorps and other 
similar ‘Euro-forces’. The question should perhaps 
be raised, in today’s new context, whether the 
responsibility is perhaps shifting towards the EU to 
create a much more ambitious and comprehensive 
experience of ‘collectivity’ for its military élites, 
and to act once again as the first line of defence 
against military ‘re-nationalization’, as it did back 
in 1948 when the first Brussels Treaty created the 
first supranational defence guarantee between a 
number of European states – even before NATO 
had been invented. The practical side of this 
argument will be picked up again when I came to 
my third large question about capabilities. 
 
 
European defence in and for ‘a better world’? 
 
For the moment, however, let me move on to my 
second question which is about the scope and nature of 
external operations under an EU-driven ESDP. 
Speaking here in Germany, I may start from the view 
regularly expressed in your official statements and 
opinion polls alike that ESDP is essentially an 
instrument for use in Europe’s near neighbourhood. It is 
a view shared by Austria, Spain, and some smaller 
states but not by Britain and France, who have always 
seen European defence as naturally a global matter, 
even before the 2003 European Security Strategy 
document proclaimed that ‘With today’s threats, the 
first line of defence will often be abroad’. The 
Scandinavians and some Central Europeans, for their 
part, see the critical question not as the location or 
intensity of EU operations but as whether they are 
properly mandated, preferably by the UN. Now, the 
early experience of ESDP might seem to vindicate your 
view: apart from one small operation in the Congo last 
year, all the EU’s operations including its police ones, 
the new and rather unusual law-and-order mission to 
Georgia, and the major operation now starting in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina have taken place well within the 
OSCE area. Does this, however, truly represent the 
EU’s own logic, and thus offer a pattern likely to be 
maintained into the future? Looked at more closely, all 
the EU’s operations in the Balkans, except one police 
one (in Bosnia-Herzegovina), have been taken over 
from NATO at a stage when the problems of the 
countries concerned needed to be resolved primarily by 
political and economic transformation – in the direction 
of EU membership! – thus making the military task 
more of an instrumental one, requiring especially close 
coordination with civil efforts. In short, I would argue 
that the EU is taking over these jobs not because they 
particularly play to its military strengths but because 
they can only be completed successfully with its civil 
ones. Moreover, the EU did not have to muster the 
political will and unity or take the political risks 
required for the first intervention in any of these cases, 
and I have my doubts whether it would find it easy to 
be the ‘first in’ in any wholly new crises arising in our 
near abroad. Would EU politicians want to take the lead 
in a crisis in the Caucasus, facing the risk either of 
acting with, or acting against, Russian forces? Would 
France agree to an intervention in Algeria or Spain to 
an action in Morocco, with all the neo-colonial 
overtones it would carry? More generally and perhaps 
more seriously, I would argue that the EU’s supreme 
security instrument in its own wider region has always 
been the enlargement process, including the 
transformation of political and broader security 
philosophies that it demands from its candidates, as 
now highlighted in the latest decisions on Turkey. 
Secondary but still valuable tools are the EU’s new 
‘partnership’ arrangements in the zone from Belarus 
down to Egypt, which include specific security aims 
and conditionalities, and the programmes of functional 
security cooperation that the EU is developing with 
relevant neighbours to tackle problems like terrorism 
and non-proliferation, smuggling and illegal migration. 
In none of these, it seems to me, does the active and 
operational use of ESDP assets play much of a part, 
although sharing ESDP’s norms and lessons with the 
candidate states is now part of the enlargement process, 
and (in my view) the topics of defence reform and 
assistance could and should be developed much more 
explicitly in other partnership relations as well. 
 
Paradoxically, seen on a purely European logic, there 
may be greater comparative advantage in the use of the 
EU’s military instrument in more distant regions: (a) 
because the EU has fewer alternative forms of direct 
engagement to offer such countries (certainly not the 
integration process), and (b) because there is less risk 
that the EU will be interpreted as acting in its own 
selfish territorial interests, and thus as becoming itself a 
kind of party to the problem. There are actually two 
more ‘selfish’ types of action that the Europeans have 
taken together in the past and could still probably reach 
consensus on repeating under ESDP, namely the 
evacuation of their own citizens from a danger spot, and 
naval actions to protect the free passage of shipping by 
patrolling and/or mine clearance. But most of the 
realistic ‘out-of-area’ scenarios would involve 
European tasks and motives that are ‘softer’ at least in 
the political sense, ranging from traditional 
peacekeeping as in the Congo, through more 
specialized humanitarian or perhaps disarmament-
related tasks, to disaster relief of the sort we have 
recently witnessed US forces carrying out on a grand 
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scale in South-East Asia. The new EU Security Strategy 
rightly argues that Europeans have an interest in doing 
these things even where there is no direct link to their 
own affairs, as a demonstration of their commitment to 
the international order and to universal values, and as a 
contribution both to the settlement of existing crises and 
the alleviation of distress that could lead to more 
conflicts in future. If we think along these lines, it will 
become clear that the ‘softer’ and more unselfish the 
ESDP’s goals are meant to be, the more global in 
principle should be their implementation, and vice 
versa. 
 
Now, I am well aware that this line of argument alone 
cannot overcome all reservations about a global ESDP 
in Germany or elsewhere, especially against a 
background where Britain and France have associated 
the idea of long-range missions with stricter technical 
standards for the contributing forces, and with keeping 
open the options of military strikes against targets 
related to terrorism or proliferation. Personally, I think 
a lot of this problem goes back to the frustrations 
Britain and France face in trying to make demanding 
standards ‘bite’ on their neighbours’ military planning 
in a framework that is only supposed to be ‘about’ 
properly mandated crisis management.  (Cf. the 
arguments above about how much easier the planning 
debate would be in some ways if we could only start 
talking about ‘real’ defence). On any realistic view, if 
the more aggressively inclined Europeans want to strike 
against terrorists or WMD possessors they will go off 
and do it in ad hoc coalitions, just as has happened 
within the membership of the UN and NATO. 
However, I would not deny that there are large 
problems of principle, of a somewhat different kind, 
that lie in the way of pursuing any full-out 
‘globalization’ of ESDP. There is the question of 
excessively ‘militarizing’ the image of the EU, whose 
peaceful and non-threatening nature has so far served it 
in very good stead. There is the risk that if the EU goes 
global without properly working out first what its own 
special aims and principles are, it will be dragged into 
unconscious imitation of or politically motivated  
competition with the US and NATO, thus losing sight 
of its proper comparative advantages and probably 
generating more political problems than it solves. There 
is the uncomfortable fact that Europe does have some 
specific, quite selfish, interests in the wider world such 
as securing the sources and transit of vital strategic 
commodities, protecting its expatriates and overseas 
investments, choking off disruptive immigration at 
source, and so on: a properly designed policy would 
have to face up to this, and should debate the proper 
line and balance between using ESDP (and CFSP 
generally) for such ends, and donating resources for the 
more ‘global community’-oriented missions that I 
mentioned above. 
 
Capacities and coordination 
 
The last point under this heading is also the one with 
which I want to start my third main question: namely, 
the balance and relationship between developing the 
EU’s military instruments and its non-military ones for 
external policy objectives. In the early days of ESDP, as 
I mentioned at the beginning, it sometimes seemed that 
EU defence capabilities were being built up for their 
own sake – or for someone else’s. A programme for 
building civilian intervention capabilities was included 
from the start, but it only covered resources to be 
deployed in the same manner as military ones, e.g. for 
police tasks or other temporary and operational work in 
the security or, possibly, political institution-building 
fields. The policy was hardly ‘joined up’ at all with 
other areas of CFSP such as the pursuit of arms control 
and disarmament, with export controls, or with regional 
security strategies using primarily diplomatic, political 
and economic levers. The missing links in this respect 
have to some extent been provided at the analytical 
level by the European Security Strategy (ESS), and by 
the widening of the definition of ESDP tasks (to include 
some clearly arms control and security assistance-
related ones) in the new Constitution. Implementation 
of the Constitution’s institutional provision notably on a 
single EU Foreign Minister, single external affairs 
service in Brussels, and strengthened EU representation 
network world-wide ought to improve coordination and, 
even more important, unity of purpose and culture 
across this set of traditionally ‘second pillar’ 
instruments. Since last year in particular, there has also 
been a much better understanding of the complex 
interface and continuum between external defence and 
security instruments and the necessary development of 
the EU’s internal security space, especially in regard to 
terrorism. The Strategy and Constitution, however, give 
no real clue on how the future ESDP is meant to ‘join 
up’ with European policies and instruments currently 
lying in Pillar One and traditionally managed by the 
Commission, such as humanitarian assistance and 
broader aid policy, trade and financial policy, 
functional realms of security such as energy policy or 
transport security or the environment – not to mention 
the ongoing Enlargement process. 
 
That this problem is more than just a conceptual one is 
shown by the challenges the EU is now facing in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, where a new military operation 
will have to be coordinated with an existing police one 
and with a wide range of EU civilian inputs and broader 
security goals, in a setting where several other 
international organizations are engaged, and against a 
policy background where a long-term accession process 
is seen as the ultimate guarantee for stabilization. As so 
often in the past, ‘learning on the job’ should help to  
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solve the specific problems of multi-functional 
engagement for the EU in this relatively familiar, if still 
far from simple, ‘near abroad’ environment. The 
lessons can, however, only be a first and not necessarily 
representative starting point for addressing the 
corresponding questions more globally. When the EU 
acts outside its own territory, should its military arm be 
the servant of, and at best a facilitator for, its political, 
economic and humanitarian engagement; or should the 
latter tools themselves sometimes be subordinated to a 
security or ‘strategic’ aim of sufficient importance? 
What would that mean in practical terms for the 
Commission’s rights vis-à-vis the now more settled and 
institutionalized leadership of the European Council? 
Equally important, since everything starts and ends with 
money, how much in the way of resources should the 
EU be putting into its specific, positive, defence and 
security instruments (including the collaborative 
development of European armaments), as against 
expenditure on arms control and weapons disposal, 
more functional dimensions of security, or humanitarian 
and other assistance policies aimed at peace and 
sustainable development? I am not going to try to offer 
answers and I don’t believe there are any easy ones; but 
I would underline here that a purely EU-based approach 
to ESDP would make it more vital than ever to address 
the question, given that this multi-functional 
competence combined with large-scale, concrete, non-
military resources and instruments is the EU’s only 
truly unique feature in the world of security (as 
compared especially with NATO and the OSCE). 
 
While on the subject of EU capacities, a lot more could 
be said in detail about the next stages in developing 
military ones, notably in the framework set by the EU’s 
new Headline Goal for 2010, the plan to set up Battle 
Groups, and the new potential linkage between 
operational plans, capabilities and equipment provision 
offered by the European Defence Agency (EDA). I 
have, however, excused myself at the start from saying 
much about this, so I will limit myself here to just one 
point. What is striking about the new set of military 
goals adopted last year is that, while still remarkably 
vague about just what missions should be carried out, 
they all create pressure for greater ongoing integration 
of European forces – not just in the context of the 
multinational Battle Groups, but also through the 
undertaking given to the UN (in an Mmemorandum of 
Understanding on UN-EU cooperation) to look at the 
possibility of a kind of permanently available EU 
‘standby force’, and through the EDA’s mandate to 
develop joint equipment programmes that are matched 
more directly to the needs of European forces operating 
jointly in the field. One can see how this trend has been 
driven by practical considerations, partly because it 
allows even closer scrutiny of various countries’ 
performance and pushes them more forcefully towards 
common reform solutions; but partly also because such 
deeper-reaching standardization, integration and 
specialization offer the only real hope of squeezing out 
more deployable capacity from essentially static 
European defence budgets. Politically and in principle, 
however, it is a fascinating development because it can 
be read as the EU’s starting to take over NATO’s 
former role of force de-nationalisation and integration, 
in a way that now extends equally to six non-NATO 
states; and because it has the practical effect of 
‘interfering’ with nations’ defence planning across the 
board, long before the Union has claimed any officially 
‘joined-up’ competence for advising on matters other 
than crisis management. It would not be the first time in 
the EU that practice has out-run doctrine, and it is not 
likely to be the last. 
 
 
The ‘will of the people’? 
 
This brings me rather neatly to my last question: do 
European publics realize this is going on, and if they 
did, would they accept it? Opinion polls actually 
suggest a high level of support right across the EU for 
general progress in common foreign, security and 
defence policies, but it is commonplace to note how 
quickly different countries’ conceptions, priorities, and 
self-imposed limitations in this field start to diverge as 
soon as it comes down to particulars. Somewhat 
paradoxically, however, one might argue that such 
popular preferences matter less in the field of common 
defence (and other external) policies than in others, 
because all EU states to differing degrees treat these as 
matters primarily for the national executive to decide. 
National parliaments can rarely control the sums of 
money used by governments for ad hoc security 
missions, as distinct from the regular annual defence 
budget. The European Parliament, as we know, has 
virtually no binding powers in this field at all (although 
it is good to note that Solana and others in the relevant 
Brussels organs are trying to communicate with it more 
freely and regularly). In consequence, several EU 
governments have been able to take steps such as 
joining the US-led coalition in Iraq (or more to the 
point currently, have not withdrawn from it) against the 
clearly expressed majority view in their public opinion. 
Given that ESDP missions will be launched by inter-
governmental decision in the EU Council structure, EU 
governments collectively could act if they wished with 
a similar freedom from democratic constraints, and in 
practice some potentially risky decisions (like 
Operation Artemis in the Congo) have already been 
taken at a speed that itself ruled out any kind of 
meaningful national consultation. I am well aware of 
the arguments in favour of doing things this way, in 
terms of being able to react fast to real threats and 
urgent cases of human suffering, as well as the slightly 
less noble motive of making the EU look good and 
strong and purposeful in the international community’s 
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eye. However, I would beg to raise the question 
whether it is safe in the longer term to run European 
Security and defence as an executive, élite programme 
without either adjusting it to expressed popular wishes 
or, conversely, making a proper effort to explain it to 
Europe’s peoples and to encourage their active support. 
 
As more EU countries move away from conscript or 
volunteer forces to permanent professional ones, it may 
become easier to supply the men for any given mission 
regardless of broader public attitudes; but this trend 
creates some normative risk of political misuse of 
European forces, and perhaps even of misconduct by 
them. It provides a further argument for what I said 
above about the need for the EU to play some 
normative role, at least at the collective European level, 
by accustoming national forces to work together in 
responsible and non-nationalistic style – on which 
logic, a true ‘European army’ might ultimately be a 
more democratic solution than the absence of one! Most 
important, however, in purely practical terms, the 
rapidly growing connection and interdependence 
between Europe’s internal and external, military and 
non-military security strategies will make it less and 
less sensible and feasible for governments to ignore in 
their external actions the views and needs of those same 
European citizens who will very much need to be 
mobilized and disciplined for the inward-looking and 
civil dimensions of the enterprise. 
 
 
X X X 
 
I asked near the beginning of this presentation whether 
the years from 2005 would be the time for the EU to 
start doing its own business for its own reasons, in 
ESDP and in its foreign and security policies more 
broadly. My own view is that the answer should be Yes, 
and my guess is that it will be. As mentioned, part of 
the short-term motivation for this is likely to come from 
anti-US feelings, but I do not believe that an EU 
security policy that is true to European ideals is against 
the USA’s interests or indeed anyone else’s interests in 
the longer run. In purely practical terms, Europe is 
likely to be inefficient and half-hearted if it only plays 
with the idea of defence to serve someone else’s 
purposes, or to impress someone else, or to annoy them. 
It can only act with conviction and longer-term 
efficiency if it can offer its own soldiers, its decision-
makers and its citizens an answer to the question 
‘Warum’. And to my mind the best and only answer lies 
in the very special thing that our European Union is, 
and the very special things that it can and must offer to 
the world.  
 
